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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
John Morgan McComas appeals from the district court’s order denying his motion to
suppress drug evidence obtained after a police officer conducted a warrantless search of his
vehicle. He argues that, contrary to the district court’s conclusion, a police officer’s sniff “alert”
to the presence of marijuana was insufficient, based on the totality of the circumstances, to
provide probable cause to search. Because probable cause was lacking, the warrantless search
violated Mr. McComas’ Fourth Amendment rights, and suppression should have been granted.
Mr. McComas therefore respectfully asks this Court to reverse the denial of his motion to
suppress, vacate his drug convictions, and remand his case to the district court.
This Reply Brief is necessary to correct the State’s mischaracterization of
Mr. McComas’s appellate arguments, to address the State’s preservation argument, and to
demonstrate that both of Mr. McComas’s appellate arguments are properly before this Court.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
Mr. McComas articulated the relevant facts and proceedings in the Appellant’s Brief.
They are not repeated here, but are incorporated by reference.
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ISSUE
Did the district court err when it denied Mr. McComas’s motion to suppress?

2

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. McComas’s Motion To Suppress
A.

The District Court Erred In Denying The Motion To Suppress Because Officer Shanor
Conducted A Warrantless Search Of The Vehicle Without Probable Cause, In Violation
Of The Fourth Amendment
Mr. McComas claims the warrantless search of his vehicle violated his Fourth

Amendment rights because probable cause to search was lacking.

His Appellate argument is

made in two parts, in accordance with the probable-cause framework set forth in Florida v.
Harris, 568 U.S. 237, 243 (2013).
1.

The State Failed To Make A Threshold Showing That Officer Howell’s “Sniff”
Was “Up To Snuff”; The State’s Evidence Was Insufficient To Establish The
Reliability Of The Officer’s “Alert”

In the first part of his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. McComas argues that the State failed to
make the requisite threshold showing that Officer Howell’s “alert” to marijuana odor was
reliable; specifically, that the State failed to establish Officer Howell had the requisite training to
detect unburnt marijuana “by its smell” alone, which is required to provide probable cause.
(Appellant’s Br., pp.11-12.)
In its Respondent’s Brief, the State claims Mr. McComas is arguing that “the same
standard applicable to drug dogs is required to show probable cause for an officer’s detection of
the odor of marijuana,” and that as such, his argument is not preserved. (Resp.Br., p.6.)

The

State goes on to complain that it “was not put on notice to try and meet a burden proof argued for
the first time on appeal,” and that “the district court had no opportunity to decide” whether the
probable cause standard of an officer’s detection of an odor is the same as for a drug detection
dog. (Resp.Br., p.6.)
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The State’s preservation argument should be rejected because, as set forth below, it: (a)
misconstrues Mr. McComas’s appellate argument; and (b) ignores the arguments, proceedings,
and rulings in the district court.
a.

The State Has Mischaracterized Mr. McComas’s Appellate Argument

Mr. McComas does not argue that the proof required to establish reliability for a human’s
detection of drug odor is the same as the proof that is required show the reliability of drug-dog’s
alert. His argument is that in either case, the “‘smell’ or ‘alert’ provides probable cause only if
there is proof of reliability.” (Appellant’s Br., p. 9.) In support of his argument, Mr. McComas
cites the Court of Appeals’ decision in State v. Gonzalez, 117 Idaho 518, 519 (Ct. App. 1990) –
the case relied upon below by both parties, as well as the district court – as central to the question
of whether a human officer’s smell of marijuana alone can provide probable cause to search.
(See R., pp.98, 105; Tr., p.23, Ls.2-7, p.37, L.s.5-9) (Appellant’s Br., pp.9-10.) Mr. McComas
points out that, while Gonzalez Court recognized, “[t]he smell of marijuana alone can satisfy the
probable cause requirement,” the Court also cited the “undisputed finding” that the officer who
smelled the marijuana “was trained to recognize by smell the presence marijuana.” (Appellant’s
Br., p. 9.) He additionally argues, by analogy, that the U.S. Supreme Court’s probable-cause
case law involving drug-detecting dog alerts is consistent with Gonzalez and supports his
position. (Appellant’s Brief, pp.7-11.)
Mr. McComas’s argument on appeal is that, unlike in Gonzalez, the district court here did
not find, nor is there evidence in the record that would support a finding, that Officer Howell was
“trained to recognize by smell” the presence of raw marijuana, and that under the holding and
reasoning of Gonzalez, Officer’s Howell’s reported “smell” of marijuana is insufficient to
provide probable cause to search. (Appellant’s Br., pp.10-11.)
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Moreover, the fact that Mr. McComas has distilled from the relevant case law, e.g.,
Florida v. Harris, 568 U.S. 237 (2013), the two-step framework for evaluating whether the State
met its burden of demonstrating probable cause (see Appellant’s Br., p.9), does not somehow
subject the State to a new or different “burden” of proving probable cause. It is well-established
that the State bears the burden of presenting proof to justify a warrantless search, and thus the
burden to present sufficient proof to demonstrate probable cause. Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S.
390 (1978); Harris, 568 U.S. at 243; State v. Yeoumans, 144 Idaho 871, 873 (Ct. App. 2007).
Under the Idaho Court of Appeals’ decision in Gonzalez, in order to justify a warrantless search
based on a police officer’s smell of unburnt marijuana alone, the State must show the officer
“was trained to recognize by smell” the presence of the marijuana. Gonzalez, 117 Idaho at 519.
Mr. McComas is not arguing for any standard other than the one embraced by Gonzalez.
Contrary to the State’s mischaracterization, he is not arguing that the State was required to
demonstrate the officer’s reliability “in the same manner as it would do for a drug dog.”
(Resp.Br., p.6.)

Accordingly, the State’s assertion that such argument is not preserved is

irrelevant and unavailing and should be rejected.
b.

The State’s Claim Of Lack Of Notice And Opportunity Is Undermined By
The Record

The State’s complains that it “was not put on notice to try and meet” its burden of proof
in the district court (Resp.Br., p.6), but this complaint ignores the arguments, proceedings, and
rulings in the district court.

For example, in its memorandum opposing Mr. McComas’s

suppression motion, the prosecutor argued, “there is probable cause for a search when a trained
officer detects the smell of marijuana in a vehicle,” and the prosecutor cited State v. Gonzales,
117 Idaho at 519. (See R., p.103.) At the hearing on the motion, the State was provided a full
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opportunity “to make its best case”1 that Officer Howell had the requisite training “to detect by
smell” the presence of the unburnt marijuana. (See generally Tr.) In closing, the prosecutor
specifically declared to the district court that “the question before the court” was whether Officer
Howell was able to smell the drugs, and the prosecutor actually claimed the officer had “been
trained to detect drugs.”2 (Tr., p.24, Ls.3-13) However, and notwithstanding its notice and
opportunity to do so, the State failed to present evidence that Officer Howell had been trained to
detect marijuana by smell, and thus failed to meet its threshold burden of demonstrating that
Officer Howell could reliably detect marijuana by smell alone, and therefore failed to carry its
burden of establishing probable cause to search the vehicle. (Appellant’s Br., p.8.)
For these reasons, the State’s contention that Mr. McComas’s argument is unpreserved
should be rejected. The State’s argument on the merits is unremarkable and Mr. McComas
respectfully refers this Court to the argument in his Appellant’s Brief as his argument in reply.
B.

Officer Shanor’s Failure To Detect Any Marijuana Odor Undermined Officer Howell’s
“Positive Alert”; Absent Significant Additional Circumstances, Probable Cause Is
Lacking
Mr. McComas alternatively argues that, under the second step in the two-part probable

cause analysis, the district court erred in failing to conclude that the reliability of Officer

1

In Harris, the U.S. Supreme Court explained that, “a probable cause hearing focusing on a
dog’s alert should proceed much like any other. The court should allow the parties to make their
best case . . . . .” 568 U.S. at 247 (emphasis added). Here, the State had every opportunity to
make its case. However, as demonstrated in the Appellant’s Brief, the State failed to present
evidence that Officer Howell had any training or experience “in the detection of” marijuana or
any other drug “by its odor.” (See Tr., p.8, L.23 – p.9, L.19.) (Appellant’s Brief, pp.10-11.)
2
Additionally, the prosecutor and the district judge all drew the obvious, and appropriate,
analogy between the present case and cases involving trained drug-detection dogs. (See e.g.,
Tr., p.25, Ls.3-13, p.35, Ls.6-9, p.37, L.11-23.) Contrary to the State’s assertions (Resp.Br., p.6),
this comparison of human officers with drug dogs is not newly-raised on appeal.
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Howell’s reported smell, or “alert,” to marijuana odor, was undermined by the fact that Officer
Shanor detected no such odor. (Appellant’s Br., pp.12-14.)
In response, the State characterizes Mr. McComas’s argument as an attack on “the
credibility of Officer Howell’s testimony” that asks this Court to re-weigh the evidence and
resolve factual conflicts, and as such “is not a proper matter of appellate review.” (Resp.Br., p.7
(emphasis original).)

This is a mischaracterization of Mr. McComas’s appellate argument.

Mr. McComas accepts the district court’s finding that Officer Howell’s “testimony is credible”
(see Tr., p.25, Ls.11), that is, that the officer was being truthful when he testified that he believed
he smelled marijuana.

However, Mr. McComas’s argument is that the totality of the

circumstances – including:

(1) the fact Officer Howell lacked training in the detection of

marijuana by smell; (2) that the other officer at the scene did not detect marijuana odor; and (3)
the absence of any “significant additional circumstances” – the purported “smell” of marijuana
by Officer Howell was not sufficiently reliable to provide probable cause to search. (Appellant’s
Br., pp.12-14.) Thus, Mr. McComas appellate argument presents a question of law that is
subject to free review by this Court. State v. Munoz, 149 Idaho 121 (2010); State v. MartinezGonzalez, 152 Idaho 775, 778 (Ct. App. 2012); Moldowan v. City of Warren, 578 F.3d 351, 396
(6th Cir. 2009). The State’s contrary assertions should be rejected.
The State’s remaining arguments in opposition are unremarkable, and Mr. McComas
respectfully refers this Court to the argument in his Appellant’s Brief as his argument in reply.
Ultimately, the district court erred by concluding the State’s evidence at the hearing established
probable cause to search, and the district court should have granted Mr. McComas’s motion and
ordered all of the evidence suppressed.
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CONCLUSION
For the above reasons and those set forth in his Appellant’s Brief, Mr. McComas
respectfully asks this Court to reverse the denial of his motion to suppress, vacate his
convictions, and remand his case to the district court for further proceedings consistent with his
plea agreement.
DATED this 29th day of July, 2021.

/s/ Kimberly A. Coster
KIMBERLY A. COSTER
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 29th day of July, 2021, I caused a true and correct copy
of the foregoing APPELLANT’S REPLY BRIEF to be served as follows:
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL
E-Service: ecf@ag.idaho.gov

/s/ Evan A. Smith
EVAN A. SMITH
Administrative Assistant

KAC/eas
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